Hon. Raymond J. Ikola (Ret.) served as an associate justice on the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three, for over 18 years, authoring more than 1,500 opinions on a wide range of topics, 190 of which were published. He previously served for seven years on the Orange County Superior Court, where he sat on the unlimited civil panel, the high-impact trial team, the appellate division of the Superior Court and the complex civil litigation panel. He served as supervising judge of the civil panel in 2000.
Prior to his appointment to the bench, Justice Ikola practiced civil business litigation in Orange County for more than 20 years. He handled a wide variety of business and commercial matters, with a heavy emphasis on protecting proprietary rights in system-level software, air carrier access to airports and real property litigation.
- Over 18 years as a justice on the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three
- While serving on the complex civil litigation panel of the Orange County Superior Court, conducted numerous settlement conferences, with an emphasis on construction defect matters
- While serving on the civil panel of the Orange County Superior Court, conducted numerous settlement conferences on a wide variety of civil matters
- While practicing law, served as a volunteer arbitrator for judicial arbitration matters in the Orange County Superior Court
- A. Southwest 2, LLC v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 148: Investors in a three-story office building in Arizona brought an action for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud against various entities on the periphery of the transaction, alleging a failure to disclose the true “sales load” imposed on their investment. But the statute of limitations commenced to run at the time the purchase was made because the material facts of the alleged “sales load” were adequately described in the private placement memorandum used in connection with the sales transaction. The delayed discovery rule did not apply.
- Patrick v. Alacer Corporation (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995: Corporation cannot demur to a derivative complaint filed on its behalf except on limited grounds such as the shareholder plaintiff’s lack of standing.
- RLH Industries, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1277: Plaintiff alleged defendants had a sales policy that violated California’s antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, because it constituted an unlawful tying arrangement. Inter alia, the commerce clause does not bar application of California’s antitrust law to out-of-state anticompetitive conduct that causes injury in California.
- Richard B. Levine, Inc. v. Higashi (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 566: In an action against a medical partnership’s accountants, arising out of a buyout of the plaintiff partner, a previous arbitration award in favor of the accountant’s alleged co-conspirators barred any claim by the plaintiff partner against the accountants grounded on theories of aiding and abetting or conspiracy. Further, the plaintiff partner failed to establish an independent duty owed by the accountants to plaintiff.
- Casey v. U.S. Bank National (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1138: A debtor corporation’s bankruptcy trustee brought an action against several banks alleging that the banks had aided and abetted the debtor corporation’s officers and directors in looting the debtor corporation. Although a bank ordinarily does not owe any duty to non-depositors (the debtor corporation), it may incur liability for aiding and abetting its own depositors in looting the non-depositor corporation, provided the plaintiff can show the bank had knowledge of the primary wrong being committed by its depositors.
- Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 949: Divorced wife had standing as third-party beneficiary to plead cause of action for breach of express warranty against jeweler who had sold an engagement ring to her ex-husband.
- Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38: Lawyer sued a successor lawyer on a case alleging conversion of and interference with settlement funds received by the successor lawyer. Triable issues of fact existed as to whether plaintiff had an immediate right to possess the settlement funds through an attorney’s lien. Summary judgment was reversed.
- Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204: In a malicious prosecution action, defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was granted, and the case was dismissed. A principal issue concerned the standards by which a client’s malice could be attributed to the client’s attorney.
- Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316: In an action for medical negligence (based on lack of informed consent) and battery (based on the lack of any consent), denial of JNOV motion on battery claim was reversed because the verdict form omitted a finding on whether the medical procedure was performed without any consent. Jury finding that procedure was done without informed consent was not sufficient to sustain judgment on battery cause of action.
- Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 640: Plaintiff decedent was killed when his helicopter crashed during a fire suppression mission. Plaintiff contended the crash was caused by a defective fuel-transfer system. The jury awarded a wrongful death verdict exceeding $8 million. Substantial evidence supported the verdict. A defense under an 18-year statute of repose (the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994) was not established.
- Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 452: Defense verdict in medical malpractice case was reversed because trial court improperly allowed prejudicial evidence of alienage. Defense counsel improperly cross-examined her own client, who testified as an expert for the plaintiff.
- Kim v. Konad USA Distribution (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336: Plaintiff’s complaint for wrongful discharge alleged three causes of action under the California Fair Housing and Employment Act and one common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. After the close of evidence, defendants objected to the court’s statement of decision awarding damages to plaintiff on the ground plaintiff had failed to prove exhaustion of administrative remedies. Defendants also moved to vacate the subsequent judgment. In response, plaintiff presented evidence of her administrative complaint and her right-to-sue letter. There was no jurisdictional error in the fundamental sense; the court had subject matter jurisdiction and the judgment was affirmed.
- Mendoza v. Western Medical Center Santa Ana (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1334: Plaintiff sued for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, alleging he was terminated for reporting sexual harassment. Jury verdict in favor of plaintiff reversed for new trial. Jury was improperly instructed that plaintiff’s report of sexual harassment must be a motivating reason for the discharge rather than the substantial motivating reason.
- Carter v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1313: Following a verdict exceeding $1 million in an employee’s sex and age discrimination lawsuit, the court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate impact sex or age discrimination. Defendant’s JNOV motion should have been granted.
- City of Costa Mesa v. D’Allesio Investments (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358: The City of Costa Mesa and the State of California sought injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance; namely, the operation of massage parlors engaged in prostitution and other merchants engaged in the unlawful distribution of cannabis. The property owner responded with a cross-complaint for defamation alleging several city employees had made defamatory statements about activity on the property. The cross-complaint was met with an anti-SLAPP motion, which both the trial court and the Court of Appeal determined met the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis: The statements were made “in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body.” (§ 425, 16, subd. (e)(2).)
- Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209: Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s denial of a writ of mandate challenging the certification of an EIR for a proposed park, claiming the city had engaged in improper “piecemealing” by failing to consider a neighboring development as part of the park “project.” The project’s definition properly excluded the neighboring development, and substantial evidence supported the EIR’s conclusions.
- Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334: Plaintiff sued auto manufacturer for breach of express and implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and fraudulent concealment. There was no evidence that the manufacturer knew about the alleged electrical defect at the time of sale and thus no evidence of fraudulent concealment. But by the time the manufacturer’s duty to repurchase under Song-Beverly arose, it was aware of the defect and chose not to repair it adequately.
- Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334: Plaintiff alleged the auto manufacturer was liable under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for breach of warranty on the sale of a certified pre-owned vehicle. Although the Song-Beverly Act generally binds only distributors and retail sellers in the sale of used goods, the manufacturer stepped into that role by issuing an express warranty in the sale of the used vehicle.
- Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583: Class action against seller of telephones alleging causes of action under the Unfair Competition Law and unjust enrichment. Disputed issues included whether plaintiffs had standing under the then recently amended Business and Professions Code section 17204 to accord standing only to those who “suffered injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of [the] unfair competition,” and whether plaintiff could obtain restitution where he had received all he had expected in the transaction.
- Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394: In wrongful foreclosure action, plaintiff had no equity in the foreclosed property, but because wrongful foreclosure is a tort, plaintiff was permitted to seek recovery of any damages proximately caused by the wrongdoing, including lost rental income and emotional distress.
- Boschma v. Home Loan Center (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230: In an action under the Unfair Competition Law and for fraud, the defendant lender had failed adequately to disclose to plaintiff that the loan would negatively amortize even if plaintiff timely made the monthly payments according to the only payment schedule provided to plaintiff at the time the loan closed.
- Kemp Bros. Construction v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474: In appeal from a right-to-attach order, the fact that the primary contractor on a public works project had the right to substitute another subcontractor under Public Contract Code section 4107 did not collaterally estop removed subcontractor from contesting subsequent prime contractor’s breach of contract action.
- V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166: At the six-month review hearing in a dependency proceeding, the trial court terminated reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The Court of Appeal granted the mother’s petition for writ of mandate compelling the trial court to continue the matter to a 12-month review, holding that the trial court had erroneously applied the 12-month review standard instead of the six-month review standard.
- Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004: In a proceeding under Family Code section 7822 to free a minor from the parent’s custody as a precursor to adoption, trial court found the parent had abandoned the minor and terminated parental rights. Substantial evidence supported the judgment.
- Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818: In an appeal from a domestic violence restraining order, the restrained party contended the court was required to have given notice under Family Code section 3044, subdivision (f) (now subdivision (h)), that a finding of domestic violence would create a rebuttable presumption that an award of custody to the restrained person would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. The notice was required in a custody dispute, not the underlying proceeding for the domestic violence restraining order.
- In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925: In a marital dissolution proceeding, the determination of the date of separation does not depend on what third parties or the public generally believes. Rather, it depends on whether one of the parties intended to end the marriage and there was objective conduct “‘bespeak[ing] the finality of the marital relationship.’” (Id. at p. 927.)
- Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443: “A defendant may not use court proceedings for its own purposes, while remaining uncooperative with a plaintiff’s efforts to use those same court proceedings, and then, upon failing to achieve defendant’s own objectives in court, and at the time when the parties should be engaged in final trial preparation, demand arbitration for the first time.” (Id. at p. 1446.)
- Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208: An attorney lacks the apparent authority to sign an arbitration contract on behalf of his or her client. Without express authority to do so, an attorney does not have implied plenary authority to enter into contracts on a client’s behalf.
- Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110: In lawsuit by homeowners against a contractor for negligent mold remediation, the contractor moved to compel arbitration of the dispute under an arbitration agreement that expressly provided that the procedural provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would be utilized in the arbitration. The parties’ choice of the federal procedural requirements thus controlled over conflicting provisions of the California Arbitration Act.
- LA Sound USA, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1259: Insurer was entitled to rescind its policy of insurance ab initio because its insured had misrepresented and concealed a material fact in its policy application, even if the misrepresentation and concealment was unintentional or made only by the insured’s broker.
- Ward General Ins. Services, Inc. v. Employers Fire Ins. Co. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 548: The coverage issue here was whether a first-party insurance policy covered the loss of stored computer data not accompanied by the loss or destruction of the storage medium. “[T]he loss of the database, with its consequent economic loss, but with no loss of or damage to tangible property, was not a ‘direct physical loss of or damage to’ covered property under the terms of the subject insurance policy, and, therefore, the loss is not covered.”